Those Who Cannot Learn from History Are Doomed to Repeat It

The parallels between the American adventure in Iraq and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980's would be instructive if anyone in power in the United States would try to learn from it.

The Soviet-Afghan War
The Afghans never warmed to the Soviet occupation. There were protests, general strikes, and a infant insurgency. Still, it seemed to go well early. In the second year, 1980, there was a small, token troop withdrawal. But the pro-Soviet Afghan government was incompetent, the Soviet civilians in country (the KGB) were renown for both their corruption and brutality - not unlike the American mercs in Iraq today.

The Soviet Surge
While the Soviets never had the succinct phrase "as they stand up, we will stand down," their goal was the same. They wanted to build up the Afghan forces so the Red Army could go home. In 1983, during the fifth year of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the mujaheddin insurgency was growing both in strength and efficiency. The Soviet Union decided to surge in an additional 30,000 troops (raising troops levels from 80,000 to 110,000). Their plan was to suppress the insurgents and buy time to train the Afghan Army.

An article published by the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1996 listed the goals of the Soviet military occupation, goals remarkably similar to the US Army strategy for Iraq.

stabilizing the country by garrisoning the main routes, major cities, airbases and logistics sites;

relieving the Afghan government forces of garrison duties and pushing them into the countryside to battle the resistance;

providing logistic, air, artillery and intelligence support to the Afghan forces;

providing minimum interface between the Soviet occupation forces and the local populace;

accepting minimal Soviet casualties; and,

strengthening the Afghan forces, so once the resistance was defeated, the Soviet Army could be withdrawn.

How Did It Work?
The Surge became a permanent escalation. Troops levels stayed above 110,000 for five years, until the Red Army began to withdraw in 1988. The Soviets trained the Afghans to fight like modern soldiers, they would then desert and take their weapons to join their tribal militas and use their training to kill Russians. From the same article are some of the lessons learned by the Red Army in Afghanistan that the US Army has failed to heed.

A guerrilla war is not a war of technology versus peasantry. Rather, it is a contest of endurance and national will. The side with the greatest moral commitment (ideological, religious or patriotic) will hold the ground at the end of the conflict.

Battlefield victory can be almost irrelevant, since victory is often determined by morale, obstinacy and survival.

Tactics for conventional war will not work against guerrillas.

Support of the population is essential for the winning side.

The Red Army suffered 13,310 deaths and 35,478 wounded during nine years of war. The US Army has had 2,979 killed and 22,032 wounded in less than four years. These are very similar numbers. The Red Army averaged about 450 casualities per month; the US Army is averaging over 500 casualities per month. The better survival rate of wounded soldiers (8 to 1 in Iraq; 3 to 1 in Afghanistan) is a sign of better body armor, not less intense fighting.

The lessons are there in history. The United States leadership seems determined to repeat history along it's bloody, failed path.